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I n mid-February 201 1, in the wake of popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, members of the Libyan public began protesting against the decades-old regime 
of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The situation rapidly escalated as the govern-
ment sought to forcibly suppress the demonstrations. By early March the situation 
had deteriorated into an armed conflict. 
A number of international organizations responded to the crisis in Libya as it 
evolved. They utilized a variety of different tools, ranging from official statements 
and press comm uniques to the adoption of sanctions and other legal measures. On 
March 19, 20 I I, a coalition of States initiated a bombing campaign in Libya. The 
United Nations Security Council authorized this enforcement action in response 
to reports of serious violations of international human rights law and the interna-
tionallaw of armed conflict committed in Libya by persons acting on behalf of the 
Gaddafi regime . 
• ProfessorofLawand Director, Centerfor lntemational Law & Policy, New England Law I Boston. 
International Enforcement in NIAC: The Case of Libya 
This article provides an overview of applicable rules of international law 
through different phases of the situation in libya and sketches out various modes of 
enforcement action employed by international organizations to respond to the crisis, 
analyzing several of the controversial legal issues that arise in that context. The article 
concludes with an analysis of the unresolved legal issues implicated by the evolving 
situation in Libya and by the international community's responses to it. 
Applicable Law 
Non-intervention 
One ofthe fo undational principles of the international legal order, and a corollary 
to the equally fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of States, the principle 
of non-intervention requires all States to refrain from interfering in the internal af-
fairs of other States, or, in the words of the UN Charter, in "matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of other States.l While the scope of this 
principle was traditionally understood to preclude international regulation of the 
way in which a State treated its own people, that understanding has evolved consid-
erably since, at the latest, the advent of the UN Charter system. 
In light of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter and the practice of 
Charter bodies, it is now generally accepted that serious human rights abuses, even 
if committed purely within a State (i.e., not involving aliens, foreign territory or 
any other material interests of other States), are no longer regarded as internal mat-
ters shielded by the principle of non-intervention. Most States are also parties to 
specific human rights treaties, further internationalizing the issue of how they treat 
their own people and correspondingly diminishing the scope of the principle of non-
intervention. Nonetheless, mere political wrangling, even ifit involves the failure to 
meet international expectations of good governance, remains a purely internal mat-
ter so long as it does not entail violations of international legal obligations. 
The Use of ForcelJus ad Bellum 
Another fundamental rule of international law is the prohibition on the use of 
force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that "[a[ll Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use offorce against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations." The two established exceptions to this 
prohibition are valid exercises of the right of self-defense and enforcement action 
taken in accordance with UN Securi ty Council authorization.2 These international 
rules on the use of force apply only between States. Thus, the prohibition on the use 
of force does not apply internally to a State.3 
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The Law of State Responsibility for Injury to Aliens 
This body of international law regulates the way States treat foreigners. It provides 
for a baseline of humane treatment, essentially protecting foreigners against seri-
ous human rights abuses, denials of justice and other unjustified deprivations of 
liberty or property. Embedded in the traditional State-centric international legal 
system, the responsibility of the wrongdoing State, in general, may be invoked only 
by the State of nationality of the victim.4 
The Law of Armed Conflict/Jus in Bello/International Humanitarian Law 
The international law of armed conflict regulates the conduct of hostilities and 
provides legal protections for individuals not-or no longer-taking part in the 
hostili ties. As such, the vast majority of its provisions apply only in times of armed 
conflict or occupation. Prior to World War II, the jus i" bello generally applied to 
inter-State armed conflicts. Starting with the Geneva Conventions of 19495 it also 
began to regulate non-international armed conflicts, including purely internal 
armed conflicts. With the advent of international regulation of non-international 
armed conflict came the direct applicability of international humanitarian law to 
non-State, organized armed groups.1i While international law still provides more 
extensive regulation of inter-State armed conflicts than of non-inter-State armed 
conflicts, the extent of difference has diminished. 
International Criminal Law in the Strict Sense 
International criminal law in the strict sense refers to those rules of international 
law the breach of which gives rise to individual criminal responsibility in interna-
tional law.' These rules ofinternational law directly bind individuals, as opposed to 
operating through the vehicle of domestic law (e.g., suppression treaties). The core 
crimes in international criminal law are war crimes, genocide, crimes against hu-
manity and aggression. As Libya is not a party to the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Libyan nationals committing acts entirely within Libya are 
bound only by those international criminal prohibitions that have acquired the 
status of customary international law. Most, but not all, of the crimes prohibited by 
the ICC Statute were prohibited by customary international law during the rele-
vant period. 
International Human Rights Law 
International human rights law, in general, regulates the way a State treats 
individuals under its control by requiring States to respect and ensure certain 
fundamental rights of the human person.8 As noted above, the evolution of this 
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relatively modern body of international law has greatly reduced the scope of the 
non-intervention principle in relation to a State's conduct toward its own people. 
Unlike the areas of international law identified above, human rights law is prin-
cipally treaty-based. Libya has been a party to several universal and regional human 
rights treaties since well before the 2011 unrest. Libya is a party to, inter alia, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)9 and its firs t Optional 
Protocol,IO the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, II 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Fonns of Racial Discrimination,13 the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women l~ and the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights. IS 
The 1CCPR is subject to derogation. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR, States parties 
may take measures derogating from certain obligations under the Covenant to the 
extent strictly necessary to respond to a "public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation." Among the derogable rights are the rights to freedom of expression, 
to freedom of movement, to freedom from arbitrary detention and to a fair trial.16 
States parties must officially proclaim a state of emergency and must notify other 
States parties through the intermediary of the UN Secretary-General.11 According 
to available UN records, at no time during the 20 1 1 unrest did Libya lodge a notice 
of derogation with the Secretary-General. 
Phases of the Conflict and Modes of International Enforcement 
Prior to the February Unrest 
Prior to the unrest, the applicable law included all of the above bodies of interna-
tionallaw, except for the law of armed conflict, and those rules of international 
criminal law derived from the law of armed conflict since there was no armed con-
flict in existence. Libya was fully bound by its obligations under all of the human 
rights treaties to which it was a party and also by norms of customary human rights 
law.ls Similarly, Libya was bound by the requirements of the law of State responsi-
bility for injury to aliens in its relations with foreigne rs (particularly those within 
its territory). Libya and individuals within Libya were also under an obligation to 
refrain from committing the international crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity. Other States, in their relations with Libya, were bound by the prohibi-
tion on the use offorce and the principle of non-intervention. States were obliged 
to refrain from interfering in the internal functioning of the Libyan political sys-
tem, at least to the extent that its functioning did not contravene Libya's interna-




By mid-February a series of protests broke out across Libya. Once the unrest in 
Libya reached the point of a "public emergency which threaten[ed] the life of the 
nation," Libya could have claimed an authority to derogate from some of its obli-
gations under the ICCPR to the extent "strictly required by the exigencies of the sit-
uation. "20 This would have permitted the Libyan government a freer hand in arrest 
and detention matters, as well as in restricting the freedom of expression, the free-
dom of movement and the freedom of association. As noted above, Libya did not 
provide notice of derogation to the treaty depositary. Nonetheless, there is some 
authori ty to suggest that the failure to notify does not of itself preclude the lawful-
ness of derogation.2I While in principle most of the rights in the ICCPR are 
derogable, the burden would be on Libya to demonstrate the necessity for each re-
striction imposed.22 
In any event, reports soon emerged of violations of non-derogable rights, such 
as the right to life and to freedom from torture. The gravity of the reported viola-
tions brought the matter beyond the internal sphere, and gave standing to other 
States and international organizations to invoke the international responsibility of 
Libya. Notwithstanding these violations, at this stage recognition of any entity 
other than the Gaddafi regime as the government of Libya would likely still have 
constituted a prohibited intervention in Libyan internal affairs. The use of force 
against Libya remained prohibited. Notwithstanding the emerging notion of the 
responsibility to protect, which may provide enhanced standing to take diplomatic 
measures or economic sanctions, the use offorce remained precluded absent Secu-
ri ty Council authorization.23 The use of force could not be justified on the basis of 
collective self-defense since the protesters, as non-State actors, had no interna-
tional legal right of self-defense under the jus ad bellum. 
February 25: UN Human Rights Council Special Session 
One of the first organizations to adopt operative measures was the UN Human 
Rights Council. On February 25, 2011, the Council convened a special session on the 
"situation of hwnan rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." This was the fifteenth 
special session of the Council since its creation in 2006. One of the advances of the 
Council over its predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights, is the relative 
ease of convening special sessions. While the Commission required the support of 
a majority of members, the Council can convene a special session with the support 
of only one-third of its members. 
Several others factors contributed to the convening of this special session. Libya 
was at the time a member of the Human Rights Council. In addition, as noted 
above, Libya is a party to a number of international human rights treaties. There 
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was thus a clear legal basis for invoking Libya's international responsibility. Lastly, 
the Libyan ambassador to the Human Rights Council had by this time ceased to 
support the Gaddafi government and supported the convening of the special 
seSSion. 
In its Resolution S- 15/1 of February 25, 201 1, the Human Rights Council de-
cided to establish an international commission of inquiry and to recommend that 
Libya be suspended from the Council. 
After recalling official statements on the situation made by other UN bodies, 
the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the African Union 
and the European Union, the Human Rights Council strongly condemned the 
"gross and systematic" human rights violations being committed in Libya, and 
suggested that some of the abuses might rise to the level of crimes against 
humanity,24 It also "strongly call[ed] upon" the government of Libya to fulfill its 
"responsibility to protect" its population; to comply with its human rights obliga-
tions, placing particular emphasis on the freedoms of expression, assembly and in-
formation;25 and to "stop any attacks against civilians."26 
The Human Rights Council urged the Libyan government to "respect the popu-
lar will, aspirations and demands of its people and to make [its] utmost efforts to 
prevent further deterioration of the crisis. "27 The Council also stressed the need to 
hold accountable "those responsible for attacks in [libya], including by forces un-
der Government control, on civilians."28 In addition, it reminded Libya of its com-
mitment, as a member of the Council, "to uphold the highest standards in the 
promotion and protection of human rights and to cooperate fully with the Council 
and its special procedures."29 
The Council then decided to "urgently dispatch an independent, international 
commission of inquiry ... to investigate all alleged violations of international 
human rights law in [Libya], to establish the facts and circumstances of such viola-
tions and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsi-
ble." Its express purpose was to ensure "that those individuals responsible are held 
accountable."30 
Finally, the Council recommended to its parent body, the UN General Assem-
bly, that Libya's "rights of membership" in the Council be suspended, "in view of 
the gross and systematic violations of human rights by the Libyan authorities."11 
February 26: UN Security Council Emergency Meeting 
On February 26, the day after the special session of the Human Rights Council, the 
UN Security Council convened an emergency meeting. The Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 197032 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
took binding measures under Article 41 of the Charter, including the imposition of 
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an arms embargo, a travel ban and an asset freeze. It also referred the situation in 
Libya to the ICC)) As with the Libyan ambassador to the Human Rights Council, 
the ambassador of Libya to the United Nations had ceased to support the Gaddafi 
government and spoke in support of the Security Council resolution. 
The preambular paragraphs of the Security Council resolution refer to the 
"gross and systematic violations of human rights" taking piace,:J.I as well as serious 
violations of "international humanitarian law."35 The reference to "international 
humanitarian law" may indicate a perception that the situation in Libya had by this 
time evolved into an armed conflict.36 Mirroring language employed by the Human 
Rights Council, the Security Council also recalled "the Libyan authorities' respon-
sibility to protect its population, "37 evoking the "responsibility to protect" concept 
and perhaps implying further consequences for continued failure to fulfill that 
responsibility. 
The Security Council welcomed the work of the Human Rights Council and re-
iterated its call for accountability, emphasizing the responsib ility of superiors.38 It 
then recalled the Security Council's own power to defer ICC prosecutions, perhaps 
telegraphing an incentive to cooperate.39 ln this respect, Article 16 of the ICC Stat-
ute provides that the Security Council may defer an ICC prosecution for up to 
twelve months, with the possibility of renewal. 
The resolution's operative language begins with the Council 's demand for an 
immediate end to the violence and its call for steps to fulfill the "legitimate de-
mands of the population. "40 It urges the Libyan authorities to comply with interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law,41 to ensure the safety of foreign 
nationals, to ensure the safe passage of humanitarian supplies and workers, and to 
"[ i] mmediately lift restrictions on all forms of media. "42 
The Security Council's referral of the situation to the ICC marks the firs t time 
that the referral power has been used with the unanimous support of Council 
members. The only other Security Council referral to date, that of the situation in 
Darfur, was not unanimously supported. Both China and the United States ab-
stained in that vote. China had also been a holdout for the Libya resolution, but was 
ultimately persuaded to vote in favor of the resolu tion. The Chinese delegation 
indicated that it supported the resolution "taking into account the special circum-
stances in Libya. "43 
The ICC referral is followed by a jurisdictional exclusion similar to that in-
cluded in the Darfur referral. It provides that 
nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court shall be subject 10 the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or 
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omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya estab-
lished or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been ex-
pressly waived by the State.44 
By its terms this provision would seem to exclude not only ICC jurisdiction, but 
any jurisdiction other than that of the non-State party. Some delegations have dis-
agreed with this interpretation, opining instead that it only excludes ICC 
jurisdiction. 
The resolution also provided that the ICC's expenses in this matter shall be 
borne by the ICC States parties and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily. 
The resolution created a new Sanctions Committee to, inter alia, monitor imple-
mentation of the sanctions, designate individuals subject to the measures, consider 
requests for exemptions and report back to the Council. 
March 1: UN General Assembly Suspends Libya's Rights of Membership in the 
Human Rights Council 
Acting on the recommendation of the Human Rights Council, the UN General As-
semblyon March 1, 2011, in Resolution 651265, suspended Libya's "rights ofmem-
bership" in the Human Rights CounciL4s This was the first time the General 
Assembly had used its authority to suspend a State. 
March 3: ICC Prosecutor Opens Investigation 
On March 3, 20 11 , the ICC Prosecutor announced his decision to open an investi-
gation into alleged crimes against humanity committed in Libya since February 
15.46 In his statement, he also identified certain individuals with "formal or de facto 
authority, who commanded and had control over the forces that allegedly commit-
ted the crimes," and thus "put them on notice" that they could be held criminally 
responsible if forces under their command committed crimes. In particular, he 
singled out Muammar Gaddafi, the MinisterofForeign Affairs, the head of Regime 
Security and Military Intelligence, the head of Gaddafi's Personal Security and the 
head of the Libyan External Security Organization. He further indicated that mem-
bers of opposition groups would also be subject to investigation if they committed 
crimes. 
He concludes by stating, " It is important to avoid an armed conflict in Libya." 
One could read this statement to mean that the ICC Prosecutor's position at that 
time was that the situation in Libya had not yet reached the necessary levels of vio-
lence, organization and duration to constitute an armed conflict. There is no men-
tion of war crimes in the March 3 statement. 
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Early March: Emergence of Armed Conflict 
By early March, at the latest, at least some of the forces opposing the Gaddafi 
regime had constituted themselves as o rganized armed groups . In addition, the 
violence between the government and these groups became sufficiently protracted 
and intense to constitute armed conflict, leading to the application of the law of 
non-international armed conflict.47 The application of the jus in bello also brings 
about the application of the relevant war crimes provisions of international crimi-
nallaw. 
March 12: Arab League Calls for the Use of Force 
At its meeting in Cairo on March 12, 2011, the Council of the Arab League issued a 
statement on the implications of the events in Libya and the Arab position.48 Most 
significantly, the Arab League called upon the UN Security Council to impose a no-
tly zone and to create "safe areas." The members of the Security Council had al-
ready been discussing the possibility of the use of armed force. In this context, the 
political support of the Arab League was seen as a key factor . 
In the preamble the League called for compliance with international law and 
an end to the fighting. It also called on the Libyan authorities to withdraw from 
the areas they "entered forcibly" and to ensure "the right of the Libyan people to 
fulfill their demands and build their own future and institutions in a democratic 
framework. "49 
The League Council then recalled its commitment "to reject all forms of foreign 
intelVention in Libya," but emphasized "that the failure to take necessary actions to 
end this crisis will lead to foreign intelVention in internal Libyan affairs. "50 It then 
decided to call upon the Security Council "to take the necessary measures to im-
pose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe 
areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the pro-
tection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya. . "51 
March 17: Security Council Authorizes the Use afForce 
On March 17,2011, the UN Security Council, again using its enforcement power 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, responded to the call by imposing a no-fly 
zone and authorizing the use of armed force to protect civilians and "civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack."S2 Resolution 1973 also expanded the ex-
isting sanctions and established a Panel of Experts to assist the Sanctions 
Committee. 
The resolution was adopted with a vote often in favor and five abstentions. The 
abstentions came from the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and 
Germany. The two permanent members that abstained-Russia and China-have 
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traditionally espoused robust interpretations of the non-intervention principle.53 
The abstaining delegations cited a lack of information, the failure to exhaust 
diplomatic means, ambiguity as to how force would be used and by whom, and 
doubts as to whether the use of force would effectively achieve the Council's 
purposes.Sot 
The operative text of the resolution begins with the Council's demand for the 
immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a "complete end to violence and all at-
tacks against, and abuses of, civilians."55 The Council also demanded that Libya 
comply with its obligations under international human rights law, humanitarian 
law and refugee law, and "take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic 
needs," as well as to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.56 
In operative paragraph 4, the Council authorized the use of anned force to pro-
tect civilians and civilian populated areas, while excluding military occupation. 
Specifically, it authorized 
Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through 
regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-
General, to take all necessary measures . .. to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. 
This broad grant of authority was narrowed by the requirements of "acting in 
cooperation with the Secretary-General," the limitation to protection of"civilians"s1 
and areas "under threat of attack,"58 and the exclusion of occupation.59 
The resolution also established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace "in order to pro-
tect civilians," providing exemptions for humanitarian flights and authorizing 
member States to use armed force to enforce it.60 
In addition to strengthening enforcement of the arms embargo, the resolution 
also expanded the asset freeze. Mindful that a new Libyan government would need 
these assets, the Council "[ a]ffirm[ed ] its determination to ensure that assets 
frozen ... shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the 
benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya."61 
Finally, the Security Council used its power to bind States to deprive the Libyan 
government, and those acting on its behalf, oflegal remedies that might otherwise 
be available for breach of contract under domestic law. Operative paragraph 27 re-
quires "all States"62 to take "the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie 
at the instance of the Libyan authorities ... in connection with any contract or 
other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures 
taken by the Security Council .... » 
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March 19: Coalition Airstrikes Begin 
On March 19, armed forces of France, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
others initiated military strikes in Libya pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1973. The intervention of other States' armed forces brought into application the 
law of international armed conflict.63 
On March 27, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO would undertake 
enforcement action in Libya.64 Control of the enforcement action in Libya was 
subsequently transferred to NATO under unified command. 
March 25: African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights Orders Provisional 
Measures 
On March 25, 2011, the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights unanimously 
ordered provisional measures against Libya.65 The proceedings were instituted by 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which lodged an applica-
tion with the Court after receiving a number of complaints alleging violations of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by Libya, a State party. 
The Commission did not request the Court to order provisional measures. 
Nonetheless, the Court recalled that it is "empowered to order provisional mea-
sures proprio motu ' in cases of extreme gravity and urgency and when necessary to 
avoid irreparable harm to persons' and 'which it deems necessary to adopt in the 
interest of the parties or of justice.'''66 
After satisfying itself, prima facie, that it had jurisdiction, the Court reviewed 
statements and resolutions of relevant international organizations. In light of the 
condemnations of abuses contained therein, the Court concluded that "there is 
therefore a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, as well as a risk of irreparable 
harm to persons who are the subject of the application, in particular, in relation to 
the rights to life and to physical integrity of persons as guaranteed in the [African] 
Charter. "67 
The Court then found that the circumstances required it to order, "as a matter 
of great urgency and without any proceedings,"68 the following provisional mea-
sures: ( I ) that Libya refrain from "any action that would result in loss oflife orvio-
!ation of physical integrity of persons, which could be a breach of the provisions of 
the Charter or of other international human rights instruments to which it is a 
party"; and (2) that Libya report to the Court within fifteen days on measures taken 
to implement the order.69 
The first provisional measure ordered is somewhat unclear. Use of the term 
"could" introduces a degree of ambiguity. Further, it is unclear whether the de-
pendent clause beginning with "which" describes or qualifies the preceding clause. 
It is likely that it qualifies the preceding clause, so that only those actions that 
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constitute a breach (or "could" constitute a breach) of human rights law are en-
compassed by the order. 
Mid-April: Concern about NATO Interpretation of Mandate 
By mid-April, some States. including Security Council permanent members Russia 
and China, began to claim that the multinational force was exceeding the scope of 
its mandate.1° In particular, they recalled that regime change was not authorized 
by Security Council Resolution 1973. According to some observers. NATO's 
airstrikes went beyond protection of civilians and potentially constituted a viola-
tion of the prohibition on the use of force. 
May 4: ICC Prosecutor Presents Report to the Security Council 
Pursuant to operative paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1970. the ICC 
Prosecutor on May 4 reported to the Securi ty Council on actions taken pursuant to 
the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC.71 In his report. the Prosecutor pro-
vided an overview of the preliminary examination of jurisdictional issues con-
ducted by his office, the ongoing investigation and anticipated judicial activities. 
The Prosecutor found that available information provided "reasonable grounds 
to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed and continue being 
committed in Libya,"72 and he noted that there is also "re1evant information con-
cerning" war crimes "once the situation developed into an armed conflict."n 
As to admissibility ofthe complaint, the Prosecutor indicated that his office had 
"not found any genuine national investigation or prosecution of the persons or 
conduct that would form the subject matter of the cases it will investigate."14 He 
also found that the situation "clearly meets the threshold of gravity required by the 
ICC Statute. taking into account all relevant criteria."15 He noted that there were 
no countervailing "reasons to believe that the investigation would not serve the in-
terests ofjustice,"16 and thus opened an investigation on March 3. 
In describing the ongoing investigation. the Prosecutor stated that his office was 
pursuing those who bore the greatest responsibility. He also referred to coopera-
tion activities and reported receiving "outstanding support from States Parties and 
non-States Parties alike." 
After enumerating the type and quantity of evidence collected. he indicated 
that this evidence revealed two main types of "incidents": (1) "[sJecurity forces 
allegedly attacking unarmed civilians constituting crimes against humanity." and 
(2) "[tJhe existence of an armed conflict with alleged war crimes as well as other 
crimes against humanity that appear to have been committed by different Parties. "n 
He then surveyed specific factual allegations supporting the existence of these 
types of crimes, including excessive use of force by security forces; " [s]ystematic 
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arrests, torture, killings, deportations, enforced disappearances and destruction 
of mosques";78 rape; and "unlawful arrest, mistreatment and killings of sub-Saharan 
Africans perceived to be mercenaries."79 
As to the anticipated judicial proceedings, the Prosecutor indicated that his of-
fice would soon be submitting its first application for an arrest warrant. On May 
16, the ICC Prosecutor requested a pretrial chamber to issue arrest warrants for 
three individuals, including Muammar Gaddafi. 
June 1: Commission ofInquiry Issues Report 
On June 1, 2011, the Commission of Inquiry, established pursuant to Human 
Rights Council Resolution 5-15/1, issued its report.8(I The Commission opined that 
«a significant number of international human rights law violations have occurred, 
as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity." According to the Commission, 
the large majority of violations were committed by those acting on behalf of the 
Gaddafi regime " in the pursuit of a systematic and widespread policy of repression 
against opponents to his regime and his leadership." In addition, the report noted 
that" [t]here have also been violations by opponents to the regime." 
As to methodology, the Commission "opted for a cautious approach in the pres-
ent report by consistently referring to the information obtained as being distin-
guishable from evidence that could be used in criminal proceedings, whether 
national or international." Despite its findings of numerous violations of human 
rights, humanitarian and international criminal law, the "commission feels that, at 
this stage, it is not in a position to identify those responsible, as requested by the 
Human Rights Council in the resolution establishing its mandate." 
June 27: ICC Pretrial Chamber Issues Arrest Warrants 
On June 27, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants for three senior Lib-
yan officials, including Muammar Gaddafi. This was the second time that the ICC 
has issued an arrest warrant for a sitting head of State. The first was for Omar 
AI Bashir, the President of Sudan. As with the situation in Sudan, Libya is not a 
State party to the ICC Statute. 
Unresolved Legal Issues 
The international community employed a broad range of tools in responding to the 
situation in libya: arms embargoes, economic sanctions, recognition/de-recognition, 
suspension of rights of membership, regional human rights mechanisms, a com-
mission of inquiry, an ICC referral and, ultimately, the use of force. The 
unprecedented combination of these tools and the intersections of the various 
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bodies of international law identified above have given rise to a number of unre-
solved legal issues. 
Derogation under the ICCPR 
The Human Rights Council and the Securi ty Council both condemned Libya for 
violations of provisions of human rights law and humanitarian law. Among the 
rights invoked by both bodies were the rights to freedom of expression and free-
dom of assembly, both of which are subject to limitation and derogation. 
As noted above, States parties to the ICCPR may take measures derogating from 
some of their obligations in the event of a "public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation." While no clear threshold has been established for determining 
when this standard has been met, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Council 
indicates that the possibility of derogation arises only in situations of the utmost 
gravity. In any event, this standard was clearly met by the time the situation in 
Libya erupted into armed conflict. 
In this context, two derogation-related issues arise. The first is the significance of 
Libya's failure to notify the other States parties to the ICCPR via the UN Secretary-
General of any derogation. The second is whether Libya's legal ability to dero-
gate is impeded by the Libyan government's role in creating the emergency 
situation. 
As noted above, the failure to notify the Secretary-General does not necessarily 
preclude the lawfulness of derogation.S] The notification nonetheless serves im-
portant purposes. It is an important procedural safeguard in that it puts other 
States parties on notice of the derogation and presents them with an opportunity to 
assess the situation. More significantly, it also requires the State party derogating 
from its obligations to specify "the provisions from which it has derogated and ... 
the reasons by which it was actuated."82 
Apart from its failure to notify the Secretary-General, Libya also fa iled to pro-
vide any public statement concerning derogation. There was thus no indication 
that Libya intended to avail itself of the capacity to derogate. Nor was there any in-
dication of what measures wouJd be taken in derogation of its obligations, the de-
gree of derogation or the extent to which such measures were necessary. More 
recent jurisprudence of the Human Rights Council supports the view that the com-
plete failure to provide this information in any form may be fatal to the lawfulness 
of such measures.83 
The second derogation-related issue is whether and to what extent a State's par-
ticipation in creating a situation of public emergency might undercut its ability to 
derogate. There are at least two conceptual models for thinking about this issue. 
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The first is by analogy to the relationship between the jus ad bellum and the jus 
in bello. 
It is a basic principle of the jus in bello that its application is independent of the 
jus ad bellum. The issue of which State violated the jus ad bellum in bringing about a 
situation of armed conflict is generally irrelevant to the application of the jus in 
bello. Once an international armed conflict has begun. the law of armed conflict 
applies equally to all parties. regulating the conduct of hostilities and providing 
protections for individuals not-Qr no longer-taking part in the hostilities. 
Nonetheless, a State that violates the jus ad bellum would still bear international re-
sponsibility for that violation, and would be obliged to make reparation for all ofits 
harmful consequences. 
Applying this model to the issue of derogation, one could argue that the cause of 
an emergency situation should not affect the ability to derogate once that situation 
has arisen. Thus, once the threshold of "public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation" has been met and the State has announced measures derogating 
from its obligations in conformity with Article 4, the applicable legal framework 
has been altered. Under this approach. international law would not look "behind" 
the then-prevailing facts on the ground. The issue of who caused the state of emer-
gency would be irrelevant to the issue of derogation. At the same time. the State 
party would still bear responsibility for any human rights violations. including 
those in violation of derogable obligations. committed in the lead-up to the emer-
gency situation. 
Another approach would be to proceed from the principle of "unclean hands." 
This equitable principle, whereby actors are precluded from benefiting from their 
own wrongdoing. is arguably a general principle oflaw within the meaning of Arti-
cle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of J ustice,lW and variations of it are 
reflected in several fields of international law, including the law of State responsi-
bility and the law of treaties. Under this approach. a State party should not be able 
to avail itself of the possibility of derogation if the government of that State party 
created the emergency situation by committing serious violations of human rights 
law (e.g., in the context of a brutal crackdown against protesters). 
There are strong arguments in favor of both approaches. The advantage of em-
ploying the fo rmer approach is that it avoids having to determine who was at fault 
in bringing about the new state of affairs. The importance of this principle in the 
context of the jus ad bellum/jus in bello dichotomy is particularly clear. States gen-
erally claim that their uses of force are lawful, and there is no standing judicial body 
with jurisdiction to determine othenvise. One could argue that the wisdom of re-
maining agnostic as to which party wrongfully caused a conillct would apply a for-
tiori in an internal context. 
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Moreover, States have agreed that irrespective of who started the armed conflict, 
certain rules must be fo llowed by all parties in order to mitigate some of its effects. 
This raises, however, an important distinction with respect to the issue of deroga-
tion. In international law, the principle of the independence of the jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello ensures that the restrictions of the jus hI bello will apply to any 
armed conflict. Derogation is in a sense the inverse. The consequence of a valid 
derogation is the removal of restrictions that would otherwise apply to the conduct 
of the State party. Another basis of distinction may be found in the nature and 
function of international human rights law. This body oflaw principally regulates 
the way a State treats its own people, formerly regarded as a purely internal matter. 
International human rights treaties also establish compliance bodies to monitor 
implementation of the obligations under those treaties, including in times of pub-
lic emergency. 
Application of International Human Rights Law during Armed Conflict 
The issue of whether and to what extent international human rights law applies in 
situations of international armed confli ct and occupation remains controversial. 
While international judicial bodies have found that international human rights law 
continues to apply in times of armed conflict,IIS some States consistently reject this 
position and instead argue that international human rights law ceases to apply or is 
otherwise entirely abrogated by the application of the lex spedalis of the jus in 
bello.86 
Despite this continuing controversy over the application of human rights law to 
international armed conflict, there now appears to be consensus that human rights 
law does apply in itlternal armed conflicts. Even the United States, which has been 
vocal in its rejection of the application of human rights treaty law to international 
armed conflicts and to transnational, non-international armed conflicts, has never 
objected to the application of human rights law to internal armed conflicts.lI? In-
deed, the United States consistently exerts pressure bilaterally on States dealing 
with situations of internal armed conflict to comply with their obligations under 
international human rights law. 
Thus, to the extent the conflict in Libya remained internal, the application of in-
ternational human rights law to it was uncontroversial. This does not mean, how-
ever, that there is not continuing controversy over the interoperability of particular 
rules of human rights law and humanitarian law in this context. There are still 
divergent views on this subject. 
As noted above, once other States began to use armed force in Libya, the law of 
international armed conflict began to apply to the conflict between those States 
and Libya. The applicability of international human rights law to international 
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armed conflicts remains unsettled, though a consensus appears to be emerging in 
favor of application at least where the relevant party to the conflict is exercising a 
degree of control over territory or individuals.88 In any event, if the role of the 
intervening States is limited to aerial bombing campaigns (Le., in the absence of 
any direct control of individuals or terri tory), then most questions arising under 
international human rights law, even if applicable, would likely be resolved by ref-
erence to the rules of the jus in bello as lex speciaiis.89 
Use of Force Issues 
A number of controversial legal issues are implicated by the Security Council's au-
thorization to use force in this context. 
Some have suggested that the Security Council's authorization to use force to 
protect civilians was a manifestation of the responsibility-to-protect doctrine. To 
the extent this assessment is accurate, it underscores the political nature of the doc-
trine. The use of force was authorized by a vote of the Secur ity Council, a vote that 
was enabled through a careful alignment of political factors, including Gadda6's 
lack of allies in the Arab world. There is li ttle indication that the response by the in-
ternational community gave legal content to the responsibility-to-protect concept, 
except perhaps as a conceptual umbrella for independently existing obligations 
under human rights and humanitarian law.90 
More controversial has been the way in which force was used by the intervening 
States and regional organizations. In particular, the international community's 
support for the mandate began to erode in the wake of concerns that NATO was 
exceeding the authorization granted by the Security Council in Resolution 1973. 
The Security Council's grant of authority to use force to "protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas" seemed to sweep more broadly than the more limited es-
tablishment of "safe areas" called for by the Arab League. Presumably, the United 
Kingdom, France and the United States preferred not to have to go back to the Se-
curity Council again if an initial grant of authority proved inadequate. Nonethe-
less, the Securi ty Council imposed limits on the authorization to use force, clearly 
envisioning a protective use offorce. Thus, despite the breadth of the mandate, it 
would not seem to encompass regime change.9l 
Key to assessing the scope of the mandate is the interpretation of the term "civil-
ian." To interpret this term in light of existing rules of internationallaw,92 one 
would naturally turn to the law of armed conflict. As the mandate was fonnulated 
against the backdrop of the internal armed confli ct in Libya, the relevant body of 
law would be the law of non-international armed conflict. 
There are divergent opinions as to the meaning of the term "civilian" in non-
international armed conflict. Some authorities take the position that as civilians 
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are traditionally defined as those who are not combatants, and as there are, strictly 
speaking, no combatants in non-international armed conflict, then all individuals 
in a non-international armed conflict are civilians. This wouJd arguably even in-
clude Gaddafi himself, as well as the members of his security forces. On this inter-
pretation, only purely defensive uses of force wouJd be permissible, as any 
offensive use of force would necessarily target those who are to be protected. 
Others reject such a broad application of the term "civilian," contending that 
those who take part in the hostilities are effectively combatants, styling them as un-
lawful combatants or unprivileged belligerents. This would include Qaddafi 's se-
curity forces, rebel soldiers and, depending upon the breadth of interpretation, any 
other individual taking part in the hostilities. On this interpretation, protection of 
these individuals wouJd fall outside the mandate. Noteworthy in this context is that 
the United States government over the past decade has advanced a relatively nar-
row conception of civilian status, excluding those taking part in the hostilities or 
even providing material support to the belligerents. In the present context, such in-
terpretations narrow its authority to use force. 
A further wrinkle is introduced by use of the tenn "civilian popuJated areas under 
threat of attack." Use of this phrase couJd expand the mandate to include protec-
tion of all places where civilians reside. In particular, it couJd be read to include 
within the mandate the useofforce to protect all parts of Libya. Of course, it would 
also then apply to towns where Gaddafi loyalists resided. 
Once the tide turned against Gaddafi and the rebels began to launch offensives 
against loyalist strongholds, the legality of continued NATO bombing in support 
of the rebels became questionable. ParticuJarly difficuJt to justify under the man-
date wouJd be the NATO attacks against retreating convoys. While some have rea-
soned that protection of civilians in Libya necessitated regime change, and that 
dislodging Gaddafi from power was a justified means of fulfilling the mandate, 
such reasoning renders the limitations expressly set forth in Resolution 1973 almost 
meaningless. 
If NATO's use of force exceeded the scope of the 1973 authorization, wouJd that 
then constitute the crime of aggression within the definition for that crime adopted 
at the 20 10 Review Conference of the International Criminal Court? The aggres-
sion amendment adopted at the Review Conference defines aggression as 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression which, by its character , gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 93 
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The phrase "act of aggression" is then defined by reference to General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314.94 That resolution does not expressly refer to uses of force in 
excess of Security Council authorization. Nonetheless, it does provide an analo-
gous category of conduct. It includes as an act of aggression " [tJhe use of armed 
forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agree-
ment of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termi-
nation of the agreement."95 Thus, to the extent the definition of aggression in-
cludes ultra vires uses of force, it could be argued that certain offensive aspects of 
the NATO bombing campaign qualify as acts of aggression. 
The definition of the crime of aggression under the ICC Statute, however, is 
somewhat narrower. In particular, the act of aggression would have to "by its char-
acter, gravity and scale, constitute[[ a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations." Given the divergent interpretations of the mandate, it would be 
difficult to conclude that any violation was "manifest," or objectively evident.96 
In any event, NATO's broad interpretation of the mandate seems to have set 
back the responsibility-to-protect doctrine as a political matter. Russia and 
China, States that have traditionally advocated robust interpretations of the 
non-intervention principle but were persuaded to acquiesce in the 1973 mandate, 
have since voted against even the mildest measures in relation to the situation in 
Syria.91 
ICC Referral Issues 
The ICC referral also raises a number of significant legal issues, including the appli-
cability of head of State immunity and the principle of non-retroactive application 
of criminal law (or nullum crimen sine lege). 
The Security Council referral was a necessary precondition to the exercise of 
ICC jurisdiction in this case because Libya is not a party to the ICC Statute.98 
Libya's non-party status is also relevant to the issues of head of State immunity and 
the application of nullum crimen sine lege. 
As noted above, an ICC pretrial chamber issued an arrest warrant for Gaddafi in 
June 201 1. As an incumbent head of State, Gaddafi was entitled to absolute immu-
nity from foreign legal process under customary international law. Although 
Gaddafi's death rendered the issue moot, the question remains whether the issu-
ance of the arrest warrant was a violation of international law, and if so, which en-
tity, if any, bore responsibility for the violation. 
The ICC has established for itself the lawfulness ofisswng arrest warrants for sit-
ting heads of State by reference to its own Statute. The Statute provides that 
"[ i[mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
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of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. "99 Thus, those States that are 
parties to the treaty have effectively waived immunity claims. This is not true for 
States that are not parties to the treaty. 100 Nonetheless, in its decision authorizing 
the issuance of an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar AI Bashir, an ICC 
pretrial chamber found that the abrogation of immunity provided in the ICC Stat-
ute applied equally vis-a.-vis the territorial States of situations referred to the Court 
by the Security Council irrespective of whether or not that State is a party to the 
ICC Statute. tOl It remains unresolved whether this decision is consistent with cus-
tomary international law. 
It may be argued that Securi ty Council Resolution 1970, in deciding that "the 
Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully" with the Court, effectively abrogated any 
immunities. However, it is also arguable that any derogation of existing customary 
international law would have to be expressly stipulated. 
In any event, even if the issuance of the arrest warrant conflicted with interna-
tional law, it is unclear who would bear responsibility for the violation. Is the In-
ternational Criminal Court a legal person bound by customary international law? 
Even if it is a legal person, and even if it violated customary international law, it 
remains unclear what remedy would be available to injured States or individuals. 
Another issue related to Libya's status as a non-State party to the Rome Statute 
revolves around the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. According to this princi-
ple, an individual may not be prosecuted for conduct that was not proscribed by 
applicable law at the time the conduct took place.t02 As Libya is not a party to the 
Rome Statute, the criminal prohibitions set forth therein did not form part of the 
law applicable to Libyan nationals acting on the territory of Libya. Nonetheless, at 
the time the Rome Statute was adopted, there was broad agreement that most of 
the crimes included in the Court's subject matter jurisdiction had already ac-
quired the status of customary law. It was also understood, however, that there 
was an element of progressive development in the Statute, particularly in relation 
to the war crimes provisions applicable in situations of non-international armed 
conflict. 
Hardly a decade earlier, it was far from d ear whether even the most serious vi-
olations of the law of non-international armed conflict would give rise to the in-
dividual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator in international law. By the 
mid-1990s, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had 
determined that serious violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions were war crimes giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. to) The 
Tribunal's pronouncements were not met with any significant opposition from 
States. By the time of the Rome Statute's adoption in the summer of 1998, it was 
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already well accepted among States that serious violations of Common Article 3 
constituted war crimes. The Rome Statute, however, provides a much more ex-
tensive elaboration of war crimes in non-international armed conflict, going well 
beyond the provisions of Common Article 3. Th us, in considering war crimes 
charges against the suspects, the Court will have to carefully examine whether the 
crimes were well established in customary international law in early 201 1. ]()( 
Conclusion 
In responding to the situation in Libya, the international community employed 
virtually every tool at its disposal, creating an unprecedented combination offorce, 
embargoes, sanctions, and other legal and political mechanisms. The Human 
Rights Council convened a special session, issued a condemnation, established a 
commission of inquiry and ultimately sought the suspension of Libya's member-
ship, which was effected by the General Assembly in a seminal exercise of its au-
thority to do so. The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, imposed an aons embargo, a trave1 ban and an asset freeze . It also referred 
the situation to the ICC, which issued an arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi and 
two others fo r alleged crimes against humanity. Following the emergence of armed 
conflict in Libya, the Security Council authorized the use of force, which was ini-
tially carried out by a coalition of States, then taken over by NATO. 
The combination of these tools in the Libyan context reveals the extent to which 
a number ofimportant legal issues of human rights law,jlls in bello, jus ad bellllm 
and international criminal law are unresolved. Specifically, the availability and appli-
cability of derogation from ICCPR obligations, absent notification to the Secretary-
General, and in the context of a State-generated emergency situation need to be 
addressed, as does the application of international human rights law during times 
of international armed conflict , particularly in the context of aerial bombing cam-
paigns. Also unresolved is the extent to which, if at all, NATO exceeded the scope of 
the Security Council's authorization of the use of force, and if so, whether the 
crime of aggression is thereby implicated. Additionally, it is uncertain if the ICC 
violated customary international law by issuing an arrest warrant for the head of 
State of a non-State party to the Rome Statute, who would be accountable if so, and 
whether the application of certain war crimes charges in this context would trans-
gress the principle of nul/urn crimen sine lege. 
Despite the significance of these questions, the political, ad hoc nature of the in-
ternational community's response to the situation in Libya portends that many of 
these issues will likely remain unresolved for the foreseeable future. 
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